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ABSTRACT

The paper questions whether followership is a valid goal of education and analyzes a goal statement publication of the New York State Department of Education. Although not actually defined in "Goals for Elementary Secondary and Continuing Education in New York State", followership is interpreted as obedience of students (followers) to teachers (leaders) and as a necessary characteristic of an educated person. Maintaining that endorsement of this interpretation of followership is consistent with capitalist oppression of the working class, the author suggests that the overall objective of the goal statement is education based upon class structure. Supporting the allegation that a philosophy of education which espouses followership as its major objective is biased rather than rational, the document identifies the class bias of the New York Board of Regents and discusses the reciprocal nature of leadership and followership skills which would exist in an ideal social relationship situation. Some criteria for valid educational goals are suggested, including an objectively identifiable gain in knowledge or skill and competence in the process of developing values. The conclusion is that followership is not a valid goal of education. (Author/DB)

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On Followership

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On Followership

I

What Does "Followership" mean in Goals for Elementary Secondary and Continuing Education in New York State?

Everyone who has studied the history of education in the United States must have heard of the peculiar institution known as the Regents of the State of New York. Many of you will recall James B. Conant's pilgrimage through the arid reaches of public schooling, a weary journey that began about fifteen years ago and culminated in 1964 with the publication of Shaping Educational Policy [Refs. p. 24]. At that time, Conant regarded the Regents of the University as the best working model for effecting public control of education. Since 1784 the Regents have been charged with the constitutional responsibility for supervising all educational endeavors in the State of New York--public and private; entrepreneurial and eleemosynary, sacred, profane, and professional. Regents are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the legislature. Today they mostly discharge their responsibility by delegation, specifically by electing a President of the University of the State of New York who is simultaneously Commissioner of Education, that is to say, the chief executive officer of the State Education Department (SED). As Conant clearly recognized, this system guarantees that the lay public who controls education in New York is a small, select corps of distinguished and well-connected gentlepersons.

Like most clearly visible outposts of class privilege, the

Regents of the University have come upon rather hard times recently. The institution weathered the storms of the sixties with no structural damage, but the busing issue brought last year's Commissioner of Education, Ewald R. Nyquist, onto the front pages of the local newspapers. Mr. Nyquist, whose loyalty to the haute bourgeoisie is more abiding than that of Napoleon III, had the bad luck to be quoted as saying that so long as he was Commissioner, the law of the land, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, would be upheld in the State of New York. Shortly thereafter he was no longer Commissioner. His successor, Mr. Gordon Ambach, has had the good sense to say nothing on any subject whatsoever. As long as his luck holds, tenure seems assured. But a residue of political pollution attaches to the Regents as a result of the affair. The institution is not quite so far above the stress of partisan politics as Conant thought it to be a decade ago.

A second major duty of the Regents is to stimulate public interest in and support for education in the State of New York. As the demand for public funds in New York began to exceed the supply even with Rockefeller-level taxes, the SED began to explore several strategies for enlisting legislative support for school appropriations. The document I wish to consider is today a component element in one of those strategies. Entitled Goals for Elementary Secondary and Continuing Education in New York State, (Goals henceforth) this black-and-white centerfold publication is made up of an unintentionally revealing cover, (Fig. 1), a frontispiece on which appears the seal of the University and the names and degrees of the then- Regents, 1974,

(Fig. 2), "a foreword" by Ewald B. Nyquist, (Fig. 3), and some seventeen pages of text, divided roughly into three sections: "Goals," "Gaps," and "Concerns." As Commissioner Nyquist so accurately puts it, "it lists ten goals widely shared by the people of the State as to the aspirations for a fully educated person." It sets no priorities, it ruffles no feathers. Those interested in the line actually being followed in the SED turn to the "Regents Program Priorities" now issued each fiscal year. That for FY '78-'79 contains a dutiful listing of the ten "Goals" and a variety of programs quite arbitrarily assigned to one or more of these. As one might guess, the priorities go mostly to testing and to the technology of remedial reading. That program should ruffle many feathers. But, in sad truth, it will not.

The most important thing about these ten goals statements is that they have survived a two-year testing process which pretty well guarantees that no sizeable segment of the political spectrum likely to see Goals will be offended by them. This process means, among other things, that what's left out of Goals is possibly of more significance than what's put in.

The overall political strategy, in which this document is a component element, appears after the listed goals. Local school agencies and supporting services are encouraged to discover "gaps" between goal and local achievement and to develop programs "to bridge the gaps" in such a manner as to satisfy three of the people's rightful "concerns": "equality . . . quality . . . economy." (By FY '78-'79, the major concern has become "accountability.") If local schools and supporting services can show that their requests for additional resources are necessary to achieve these approved goals, then the Regents will try to

make a good public case for their appropriations bills, even "at a time when there are other strong competing claims for tax dollars [and] the public is growing increasingly hostile to increased taxes."

Watching the budgeting allocations, one sees two consequences of this strategy in the Pub Ed Biz of New York State: (i) a vastly expanded testing staff, generated by a demand for school psychologists to "measure the gaps" in quantitative terms, and (ii) an increasing resistance to compensatory programs, even (perhaps especially) those programs based on demonstrated lack of achievement by "the poor of all races, nonwhite minorities, those who do not speak English, [and the rest of those] who do not have the same educational opportunity as others in the State with similar needs and aspirations." As educational resources become scarcer, it's more than ever a case of saue qui peut. In so far as the value of Goals is its contribution to a strategy of benefiting the disadvantaged, to that extent it is likely to be kept on the back burner until Federal funds can be specifically directed toward the establishment of such programs at the local level. In the meantime, administrators report that Goals is a useful document to have around, especially for public relations purposes. ("Telephone Survey Report," n.d. mimeographed, 12 pp., a study conducted and released jointly by the Office of Program Planning and the Bureau of Statistical Services.) And thus things stand with Goals so far as my desultory research has taken me in following the trail leading to this particular use of "followership."

Now to more detail. The ten goals, given in bold-face type, appear in Fig. 4. "The educational outcomes that are the particular responsibility of the school are listed with each goal." Relevant

examples, including the particular use of "followership," are also given in Fig. 4.

Methodological Assumptions

Before I make some fairly predictable remarks about the meaning of the term in that context, let me put up three markers to indicate, in a very general way, where those remarks come from.

1. To show what "followership" means in Goals is to give an account of its appearance there, an account which may be considered either an explication of a text or an explanation of a material event. Whichever way you consider it, an e-or-e works as an account only to the extent that its premises are true and its reasoning sound. It is to be judged, in short, by the same criteria as any other scientific account of a natural phenomenon; like any other scientific account it presupposes a theory, more or less explicitly. The theory presupposed, in turn, works as a theory only to the extent that it can be consistently integrated into the first T in OTOTW--"our theory of the world" to borrow (and in his eyes, I fear, misuse) an expression of W. V. Quine (1974; McClellan & Costello, 1976).

If two conditions are satisfied, then an account of, say, "followership" appearing in Goals can be considered, I take it, an "interpretation" of that "text," as Habermas uses the expression. (1971, esp. Chap. 10) Those conditions are, first, that OTOTW must account for its own history in terms of its own most general (in our theory, physical) laws; and, second, that the account of this particular linguistic event must set it coherently within its own cultural history. I think Quine has showed how we might eventually satisfy the

first condition. Satisfying the second is a task for historical research, which I make no pretense of having performed.

2. The point of political philosophy, as of any other branch of philosophy, is to show how the conceptual structure of this branch of science, here the science of politics, fits with the framework of science as a whole. As critic, the philosopher must see to it that the ontological commitments in this branch of science do not exceed that minimum required in our most certain and exact sciences. (Quine 1974, pp. 138 ff.) Quine speaks of conservatism; clearly this is a rule of pragmatism. Following it into philosophical psychology, Quine has outlined a most elegant materialistic theory of language acquisition. (1974, entire) If Quine were to outline the political theory to which the rule of minimum ontology would lead in the domain of politics, he would again come up with a materialist analysis, i.e. some version of class struggle theory. That is strictly my view; I cannot say whether it is Quine's. A materialist political philosopher who also accepted the obligation to propound a theory compatible with the material, i.e. historical, evidence would propound some version of Marxism, broadly conceived. That again is my view. I do not know that it is not Quine's. I should like to think that it will be his when he turns his great philosophical talent to the question.

3. Politics is a branch of practical science, i.e. that part of OTOTW which comes most prominently into focus when it's important to know what we want and know how to act with full collective rationality in getting what we want. It is an extremely imprecise branch at the moment. A necessary but not sufficient material condition for the science of politics' becoming more precise and more useful is a revolution (of one form or another) in which workers seize the means of

production and smash the capitalist state. We know that we cannot get many of the things we know we want--peace, security, fulfillment in human relations, unalienated work, breakdown of racism, sexism, etc., etc.--until we have accomplished that revolution. We do not know that with a revolution we can get those things. But those are the serious questions. Which explains why the philosophically interesting political thinking arises in the debates among those materialists whose ontological commitments have become personal commitments to revolutionary struggle--and vice versa.

From the general perspective sketched ever so roughly in those three points, I proceed to an equally rough sketch of how one would show the meaning of "followership" in Goals. One starts with the material object on which is printed the word "followership." Who did the work involved in its production? What sort of relations obtain among the human beings involved in the production of this object? Who owns the means of production, etc. This line of analysis soon opens into the broader perspective of class struggle theory. From that perspective certain questions can be raised and certain hypotheses can be formed, some of which are testable by appeal to publicly available evidence. Here are some examples which I try to sell as dissertation topics to graduate students in our newly-formed Department of Educational Policy, Programs and Institutions.

- i. The trail will lead, I believe, to the Regents who represent the corporate monopoly capitalist class much more directly than is the case with most officials constitutionally charged with the duty of making policy and supervising its execution. It's an anachronism stemming from the days of mercantile capitalism when the dominant class controlled the

forces of production and repression much more directly, before the full emergence of the "professional managerial class" (the PMC, see Ehrenreich, 1977) through which today the dominant, i.e., capitalist, class maintains its position.

The SED, in turn, is the home par excellence of the PMC, the latter being "a distinct class . . . specific to the monopoly stage of capitalism." (Ehrenreich, p. 11) Goals is a rare revelation of the Regents and SED making public and explicit their joint strategy for playing interest group politics on the State scene while at the same time controlling any protests that might arise among the minority who "express disappointment with their education . . . , especially true of the poor, the disadvantaged, the handicapped, and those who do not complete their formal education." (Goals, p. 4)

Sample hypothesis from class struggle theory: the political strategy of the Regents-SED does not include organizing the poor, the disadvantaged, et al., so that they can struggle effectively, collectively to change that education which disappointed them.

Test by analysis of Goals and "Priorities": Hypothesis is true.

(ii) Can class struggle theory give us any insights into the aesthetic properties of Goals? Certain literary features of Goals one notes directly: its grammatically uncertain prose, its anonymity, its discreetly but persistently meritocratic line, its signal success in printing pious drivel and giving it the look of something serious. What does all that tell us?

Or consider Fig. 1 and visualize that cover as symbolic of the isolation and eventual alienation suffered in schooling. The sixteen boxes, each entirely untouched by any other, are the essential

elements in the design. Whatever else may be said within, the structure of the cover conveys a message: the goal of the SED is to move children through the hoops while keeping them from any essential contact with one another. (It's OK for kids to interact, bottom row, so long as they've just hanging out.) The determined grins have no apparent cause; were they to change to looks of boredom or distress, the rigidly-ordered boxes would be totally unaffected. From the theory of class struggle, we know for whom Goals are proclaimed. The children's faces are window dressing.

(iii) In that context, "followership" is to be seen as a code word, safely embedded in scare quotes and standing for obedience of the working class(es) to the capitalist class, specifically to all "legitimate" leaders of the capitalist state. Why read so much meaning in one somewhat unusual word? Any account of "followership" must include an explanation of the fact that it constitutes one half of the only social relation mentioned in Goals. Not friendship, nor "home membership" (remember?), nor partnership--neither sexual nor business--, nor companionship, nor colleagueship--not to mention discipleship, brotherhood, comradeship nor any other social relation that others have seen as a worthy goal of education. There is a goal labeled Human Relations (#4), but the goal, N.B., is not actually relating one person in one way to another; and the fine print makes it clear that "school" has no official responsibility for helping children establish, maintain, or improve any human relation whatsoever; school is concerned with "respect . . . knowledge . . . understanding . . . involvement" (whatever, if anything, that last term might mean.)

As Marx and Engels put it, "the class which is the ruling

material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual (1969, Vol. 1, p. 47) force." / "The ruling force in the material production of Goals is the same intellectual force which rules that "leadership and 'followership'" is the only social relation mentioned therein, the only social relation that survived Goals two year "development," as Commissioner Nyquist calls it. The ruling idea of the ruling class is that all social relations are ultimately relations of rulers and ruled, now coded as leaders and "followers." It is the ruling idea in the thought of Liu Shao-Chi in his long struggle against Mao Tse Tung, the antithesis of the latter's view that collective solidarity among self-reliant individuals is the core social relation to be practiced in material production and promoted as a goal of education. But the antithesis of a working class composed of self-reliant individuals united in collective solidarity with their brothers and sisters is a working class obedient, however grudgingly, to their capitalist oppressors, a working class well schooled in "followership." That's what the word means.

II

Is Followership a Valid Goal of Education?

I now break off that mode of analysis--reluctantly. I hope that we may see it carried forward elsewhere. The Ehrenreich thesis seems to me a major contribution to the theory of class struggle,* not only a clean mirror to reveal the class structure of education (particularly the Pub Ed Biz, that segment of the public trough at

*I wish to thank Linda Nicholson for making it difficult for me not to read their paper.

at which I'm privileged to feed) but also a source of practical guidance in the struggle against that same class structure. But all that's for another time.

Let us suppose that this break is caused by an interruption from the SED. We have been considering that institution as a corporate entity. But the SED is composed of many individuals in many different groupings--some of whom are more rational, ethical, and politically aware than others. That element possessing the most of those virtues is a clever devil indeed; so we shall call it henceforth. And it is that clever devil which interrupts with something like the following objection:

You have not done what you claimed you were doing: you have not given us a contextual definition of "followership" in Goals, you have given us a diatribe or worse. You will notice Goal #9 in Fig. 4. There you see that "followership" appears under the heading "citizenship skills." If you want to define the term contextually, you would state it as

1. "Skill in followership" means (df) "just whatever is the reciprocal of any particular skill in leadership."

The argument for 1 is quite simple. That position does not entail that there is but one skill of leadership. Leading an orchestra requires skills somewhat different from those needed in leading a victim into ambush. Likewise there is no one skill of followership. But for some, perhaps all, forms of leadership of the sort we would regard as citizenship skills, there are reciprocal followership skills.

Why the quotation marks? Well, we are accustomed to saying "leadership skills." So we have no hesitation in accepting "Leadership

under the heading "citizenship skills." But we are not accustomed to hearing "followership." We might be inclined to argue about what it means, write diatribes or worse on the subject. Quite simply, the quotation marks in "followership" indicate an ellipsis. We mean under "citizenship skills"

"Leadership of the civically appropriate forms and, for each form, the reciprocal form of followership, if there be any such."

We simply shorten that expression in Goals as "Leadership and 'followership'." [End of speech by the voice from the SED].

So far, so good. Before we resume this dialogue, let me affirm explicitly, one of the methodological principles presupposed in it.

PAA, the principle of analytic autonomy: it is possible to practice philosophy, including philosophy of education, in a zone of political neutrality. Applied to the topic of this dialogue, PAA means that it is possible to arrive at rationally compelling answers to questions like "What is followership? Is followership a valid goal of education?" by arguments containing no political premises "not known to be true" in OTOTW, meaning just exactly what Flew meant (1972, p. 88) by the quoted expression, for example, some of the premises employed above in the political analysis of the SED. PAA is plausible only on the assumption that we share a common understanding of the basic structure of OTOTW, which is not to deny that OTOTW is terribly controverted in many places, the region of politics prominently among them. PAA affirms only that it is possible to find other places in which to practice philosophy. Thus PAA is parallel to the only valid premise

in the neutralist's argument in the "School Is Neutral" controversy (Strike, 1972), the principle of instructional autonomy: it is possible to teach some things in a zone of political neutrality, i.e., without requiring or presupposing a learner's belief in things "not known to be true." Let us cleave to PAA.

Having agreed to PAA, the clever devil from the SED then concludes: The questions of class and capitalism and the rest are irrelevant. Leadership and followership are found in all walks of life. A person may be a leader at one time or in one aspect of life, a follower at or in another. Thus every educated person will need skills of leadership and followership. Or, put another way,

2. Skills of leadership and followership are among the valid goals of education.

Which is only and precisely what the Regents and the SED meant by "followership" in Goals. [End of SED's case]

Now it's my time again. I hope that we may be able to accept 2, properly qualified and quantified. But I cannot accept 1 & 2 together for they jointly contain a concealed political premise in violation of PAA. Consider: in using the term "followership" in 2, is our clever devil talking about slaves following their masters' orders, or serfs following the traditional ways of life of their settlement, or workers following a work-sheet under supervision by employers, or citizens of a democratic state following laws made by representatives of those same citizens, or what? We obviously cannot admit 2 into this argument until we have a politically neutral answer to that question. If "politically neutral answer" means one which does not presuppose a controverted political theory, there can in

principle be no such answer. Ergo 2 may not be admitted into this argument.

That conclusion seems to follow rather inexorably. But let us go over the whole argument again, drawing the net tighter still, else a really clever devil may escape. Let us restate 2 in such a manner that we can quantify the premises in the argument. Thus

2'. Some particular reciprocal pair of leadership-followership skills $-S_1-$ is such that S_1 belongs in G_E , where G_E is a set of valid educational goals.

Quantified

(i.)' There is at least one reciprocal pair of leadership-followership skills, S_1 .

(ii.)' There is at least one list of valid educational goals, G_E ,

(iii.)' G_E contains S_1 .

Now (i)' seems straightforwardly true. It would seem that acting in any one of those historical forms of leadership-followership mentioned above is something that can be done more or less skillfully; hence, either there are that many or more different pairs of leadership-&-followership skills, or else there is only one such reciprocal skill, demonstrated in different ways in each of those different historical social relations.

Now (ii)' is the key to the next argument, so let us reserve judgment on it for the moment, here regard it as true. Then one asks about (iii)': If there are as many skills of leadership-&-followership as there are historically known forms of that social relation, can we make a politically neutral choice among them? If there is only one, can we make a politically neutral choice between it and anarchism?

No both times. Therefore (iii)' is not a claim admissible in accordance with PAA; hence 2' must be dismissed.

But what a price to pay for political neutrality! In one way or another, every viable society will transmit certain skills of leadership-&-followership to its children. To deny 2' is to deny that the choice among such skills is a choice of or among educational goals; it is to leave the central political choice of any civilization to the realm of socialization rather than education. The clever devil made us accept a concealed political premise in his definition, 1, which then forces us to deny 2' and terminate the inquiry into followership, at least terminate that inquiry governed by PAA.

At this dead end we have three choices--we can conduct only such inquiry as, logically speaking, can go on within PAA, or forget about PAA and pursue our separate political analyses, each inquirer within the particular controverted theory that, although not known to be true, seems to him or her most coherently related to the rest of OTOTW, or we can do both. I propose the last. I have shown how I would do an overtly political analysis of "followership" and invite others to show their versions. I now wish to show that we can present a case for 2', with a very specific value for S_1 , by argument which stays strictly within the zone of political neutrality. I hope the clever devil in the SED can be tempted to follow: I have found that most, if not all, political error can be traced to a mistake in conceptual analysis.

So let us begin with the hypothesis that 2' is true. Let us grant that we have shown no value of S_1 in (i)' such that (iii)' can be defended within PAA. But if there were such an S_1 , how would we recognize it? Let us consider what we have affirmed under (ii)' above.

An immense quantity of effort and resources has been allocated to educational theory and research in the last one hundred years. One of the few increments to human self-consciousness to the credit of that allocation is the slowly-emerging distinction between education and socialization. R. S. Peters had precisely the right insight in his criterial analysis: "Education" does not refer to any particular process of socialization but rather pulls together a set of criteria by which any pedagogical encounter may be tested (Peters, 1967, Chap. 1). I tried to make those criteria a bit more precise (some have said too precise to be intelligible) with the tests of lucidity and pellucidity in teaching-learning (McClellan, 1976). Let me here be rough and brief: the process won't count as education unless it's rational and reflexive, where "rational" is defined by reference to the most general ordering principles in OTOTW ("logic broadly conceived," as Dewey would say) and "reflexive" by the application of those same principles to the pedagogical encounter itself. E.G. you can tell a child that science is a cooperative search for truth within a community of free inquiry: that telling becomes teaching and counts as education only if teller and child are themselves related as members of a community of free inquiry.

And thus we may specify some (not all) criteria for valid educational goals, G_E ,

(ii) (For any X you can think of, there is a list, G_E , such that) X belong in G_E only if

λ . X is a predicted gain in knowledge or skill in some person

ρ . X is to be achieved by conscious engagement in pedagogical processes that are themselves rational and reflexive.

γ . The philosophically disputed terms in λ and ρ , "predicted

... knowledge ... skill ... person ... rational ... reflexive ... " are consistently defined relative to each other and as consistently integrated into OTOTW as the latter allows at any given level of scientific development.

Point γ . provides for relativity in G_E ; some X may have been a valid educational goal relative to Plato's theory of the world but not to ours. G_E contains those gains in knowledge and skills achieved by "the fully educated person," to follow the phrase in Goals, a list infinitely longer than human life. The educational goals actually pursued in any society may legitimately represent a political choice among valid educational goals.

What we have seen so far is that "followership," as contextually defined in 1, cannot be in G_E . Let us declare it "inoperative" and start, very roughly, with

3. B (anybody) is skilled in followership if and only if B is a skillful follower, that is, if and only if B knows how to follow something.

Since G_E contains gains in knowledge and skills, followership is so far a candidate. Let's try a little more precision with

4. (For any X you can think of) B follows -- X skillfully if and only if and to the degree that B knows how to follow -- X.

I take it that 4. is trivially true as an analysis of doing anything skillfully. Knowing how to do X does not entail the more self-conscious knowing how X is done, i.e. knowing that X is done this way. Nor vice-versa. 4 is a pretty innocuous little premise, reinforcing the idea of 3, viz., that following -- X is, at least in those instances we're concerned about, an action, a "whole organism response," which can be done more or less skillfully. (The blank -- is

to admit such expression as follow up a lead, follow out an experiment, follow upon another's heels, follow through on one's commitments, etc. It will be omitted henceforth.)

But what 4. does is to show how to make a first cut at the main question we're after: Is followership a valid goal of education? Thus

5. (For all B's, there is some X such that)

If B is a fully educated person, then B knows how to follow X.

All of a sudden, a whole wealth of values for X appear: a rule, an idea, a plan, a speaker of Greek, an argument, a proof, a tune, a story (plot, narrative), a map, a discussion, a suggestion, a hunch, a straight line, add as many values as you choose. The large number of plausible values for X leads one to hypothesize that for every valid educational goal there is some X such that if B has attained that goal then B knows how to follow X. I tend to think that hypothesis true but cannot follow it up here.

Nor can I pause to explore other promising avenues opened in my mind by the discovery (for such it was to me, however commonplace it may have seemed to others) that following is the, certainly a, central concept in educational theory. I trust that our colleagues in neurophysiology will soon be able to give us an account of what happens when one thought follows another in the brain. Is there a difference in the form of the electro-chemical action in the brain when thoughts follow one another as scenes in a movie from the form when thoughts follow as conclusions from premises--validly and invalidly? Consider the criteria by which we distinguish what follows from what appears

(or tries) to but really doesn't follow: are those criteria built into our wiring system as genetic predispositions? Or are they entirely derived from our social heritage?

Is all learning learning to follow something? Are the natural seams in the curriculum found along the lines separating different basic modes of following? Is the difference between following an order and following an explanation a basic difference? Or is the element of constraint found in both enough to make us think of that difference as one between species of the same genus?

Leaving those speculations aside, we pick up that notion of constraint, for it is the clue to 2'; remember that it was that same element of constraint which we seemed to throw out when we detached followership from "Leadership and 'followership'" and asked whether the former alone was a valid educational goal. But let us pull what we've established with 5. into the context of 2'. I take it that a fully educated person would know how to follow a proof of the Pythagorean theorem in Euclidean geometry, The Forsyte Saga, . . . lots of other things. I take it that there are skills in following different kinds of things, e.g. mathematical arguments, novels of manners, and the like, and that such general skills can be sought and achieved by educational processes. And thus I affirm

2''. There is some followership skill, S_F , such that G_E contains S_F .

where 2'' can be quantified parallel to 2', including (ii)'' above.

But 2'' is less than half of what 2' affirmed. We started out seeking a social relation which we could affirm as an educational goal. And all we have so far is a slightly different way of expressing

standard curriculum goals. We can well imagine the clever devils in the SED grabbing the notion, throwing out the constraints of rationality and reflexivity in process, than turning it over to the Basic Competency Testing stuff to measure everyone's skills of "followership." Which won't do at all.

One might seek to resurrect 1. and define leadership as simply the reciprocal of followership. But that won't do either. Consider those X's for which 5. is true. If B is following a mathematical argument, a psychological drama . . . , then B is not necessarily in any social relation at all. To the degree that B is skilled in following X, to that degree the constraints on B (those that make B's action that of following X) are intrinsic to B, aspects of B's essential character. Those constraints do not come from B's environment, not even from such aspects of that environment which B may have "internalized," e.g. those things which Max Stirner calls "wheels in the head." (Spring 1975, Chap. 2) It follows that B's following X does not entail any social relation. In other words, 6 is false.

6. (For any value of X which satisfies 5, and for each, not every B, there is at least one person, B's A, such that)

If B follows X, then B's A and B are related as leader and follower.

So no particular social relation is presupposed in followership as an educational aim. The trick, of course, is that a very particular social relation is presupposed in the claim that the skills of followership are rationally predicted outcomes of the rational and reflexive pedagogical encounter we call teaching and learning, i.e. outcomes of

education as a distinctive form of socialization. In the central instance of such an encounter (as I've analyzed it elsewhere) — A explains something to B while B follows A's explanation — leading and following are like streams of electrons in an alternating current: B leads off with a question, A follows out the meaning of that question to the gap in B's mind, leads B to consider various ways of filling that gap, B follows A's lead till the gap is filled, follows through in the activity interrupted by the gap, and so on. Leading and following are not roles in pedagogy, they are phases in the ongoing activity. Skill in leading a student to think is skill in following the existing patterns of that student's mind, then leading it off into directions that are ready to be opened.

It is possible but excessively tedious to repeat that last paragraph in terms of bound variables. The bottom line comes out roughly as

7. (For each and every person A, and for each and every person B, and for each value of X for which 5 is true)

If A teaches B how to follow X, then A leads B

B follows A

B leads A

A follows B

A follows X

B follows X

(in one sequence,
arrangement, con-
figuration or
another!)

Now 7. gives us most of what we need to justify our affirmation of 2'. But there is one more premise we should add, itself suggested by the criteria of rationality and reflexivity in education. Consider some Xes for which 5. is true, e.g. X_1 = a mathematical argument,

Xii a sonnet, etc. Then by induction

8. If (B's knowing how to follow X) is an S_F in G_E , then G_E also contains

B's knowing what X to follow

B's knowing when to follow X

B's knowing whether to follow X

B's knowing why to follow X

etc.

I have no proof of 8. I can think of no X such that knowing how to follow X is necessary to being a fully educated person and yet one could follow X skillfully while not knowing what X one is following, why one is following X, etc. So I shall accept 8 on its initial plausibility. I might add that the only rational force behind the blatant absurdities of the competency-peddlers is their insistence on the truth of the converse of 8. Educational goals are mostly meaningless unless their proponents can specify specific associated skills of followership. Among the blatant absurdities is the idea that

following a standardized test administered within an alienated environment can be an educational goal. It may be a goal of socialization, a skill one acquires--as a recruit the skill of close order drill--to escape punishment. But surely its acquisition is not necessary to being a fully educated person.

But now we have what we need for 2: followership requires a distinctive social relation--the intricately alternating relation of teaching and learning bound up in the criteria for education, i.e. in rationality and reflexiveness. This relation as such, poses no constraints on

those so related, it is rather a way in which individuals may sustain each other in the discovery and acceptance of those constraints most integral to personal character. The character formed in that relation is the self-reliant individual. What social relation sustains that character among individuals? It is called collective solidarity.

III

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GOALS FOR ELEMENTARY SECONDARY AND CONTINUING EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE



Fig. 1

Figures

Fig. 2

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Regents of The University (with years when terms expire)

1964 JOSEPH W. MCGOVERN, A.B., J.D., L.H.D., LL.D., D.C.L.	New York
L.H.D. Chancellor	
1961 THOMAS M. BLACK, A.B., LL.D.	Santa Fe
First Chancellor	
1978 ALEXANDER J. ALLAN, JR., LL.D., LL.H.D.	Troy
1967 CARL H. FROENKELIN, JR., A.B., M.B.A., D.C.S., H.H.D.	Purchase
1975 EDWARD M. M. WASSUNG, B.S., LL.D.	New York
1960 JOSEPH T. KING, LL.B.	Shaker Island
1961 JOSEPH C. INDICATO, M.D.	Brooklyn
1976 HELEN B. POWELL, A.B., LL.H.D., LL.D., LL.D.	Rochester
1979 FRANCIS W. MCGINLEY, B.S., J.D., LL.D.	Glen Falls
1966 KENNETH B. CLARK, A.B., M.S., Ph.D., LL.D., LL.D., D.Sc.	Hastings-on-Hudson
1963 HAROLD E. NEWCOMB, B.A.	Orange
1960 WILLIAM A. GARDNER, LL.B., LL.H.D.	Buffalo
1962 ELMER I. GRIFFITH, A.B., J.D.	Rome
1961 CHRISTINE S. KLEIN, B.S., M.A.	Boydsville
1961 WILLIAM JOVANOVICH, A.B., LL.D., LL.H.D., LL.H.D.	Bethel

President of The University and Commissioner of Education
EWALD B. NYQUIST

Executive Deputy Commissioner of Education
GORDON M. AMBACH



foreword

Fig. 3

Goals for Elementary, Secondary and Continuing Education in New York State

This statement has been approved by the Regents of the University of the State of New York. It lists ten goals widely shared by the people of the State as to the aspirations for a fully educated person and describes the responsibilities of various agencies for achieving the goals. The statement also identifies serious gaps between the goals and current reality.

The statement has been two years in development, during which time drafts have been widely reviewed throughout the State. The final version has been strengthened by contributions and constructive criticisms made by many individuals and organizations in our State. The statement is now being used by the State Education Department as a basis for its plans for action in elementary, secondary and continuing education.

Each school and local school system is encouraged to use the statement as a basis for action in setting its own goals, assessing the status of its educational programs in relation to those goals, and identifying aspects of its programs that fall short of the goals. Some of these shortcomings, or "gaps" and "concerns" as they are called in this statement, will be primarily local; some, however, may be quite widespread and might best be dealt with through multi-district efforts or by the State as a whole.

In order to determine what gaps and concerns must be the focus of State effort, the Regents request that the educational community and all persons concerned about education in New York take steps to review this statement, set up school and school system action plans and be prepared to provide reactions as to State concerns related to the goals by November 1, 1974. Through such a process this statement can be a part of a continuing educational planning procedure for New York State.

Faithfully yours,

Ewald B. Nyquist

Ewald B. Nyquist

- Fig. 4
- 1 Goal:** Mastery of the basic skills of communication and reasoning essential to live a full and productive life
 - 2 Goal:** Ability to sustain lifetime learning in order to adapt to the new demands, opportunities, and values of a changing world
 - 3 Goal:** Ability to maintain one's mental, physical, and emotional health
 - 4 Goal:** Understanding of human relations — respect for and ability to relate to other people in our own and other nations — including those of different sex, origins, cultures, and aspirations
School: a. Respect for and knowledge of other social, cultural, and ethnic groups
b. Understanding one's relationship to his natural, economic, and social environment
c. Respect for the community of man
d. Understanding of home and family relationships and involvement in the home, community and society in general
 - 5 Goal:** Competence in the processes of developing values — particularly the formation of spiritual, ethical, religious, and moral values which are essential to individual dignity and a humane civilization
 - 6 Goal:** Knowledge of the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences at a level required to participate in an ever more complex world
 - 7 Goal:** Occupational competence necessary to secure employment commensurate with ability and aspiration and to perform work in a manner that is gratifying to the individual and to those served
 - 8 Goal:** Knowledge and appreciation of our culture and capacity for creativity, recreation, and self-renewal
 - 9 Goal:** Understanding of the processes of effective citizenship in order to participate in and contribute to the government of our society
School: a. Knowledge about political, economic, and legal systems with an emphasis on democratic institutions and on the global interdependence of these systems
b. Knowledge of the American political process at national, State, and local levels
c. Knowledge about taxation and fiscal policy
d. Acquisition of citizenship skills:
 1. Decision making
 2. Group participation
 3. Leadership and "followership"
 - 10 Goal:** Knowledge of the environment and the relationship between one's own acts and the quality of the environment